We present a new generic construction of a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme secure against leakage-resilient chosen-ciphertext attacks (LR-CCA), from any Hash Proof System (HPS) and any one-time lossy filter (OT-LF). Efficient constructions of HPSs and OT-LFs from the DDH and DCR assumptions suggest that our construction is a practical approach to LR-CCA security. Most of practical PKEs with LR-CCA security, like variants of Cramer-Shoup scheme, rooted from Hash Proof Systems, but with leakage rates at most 1/4 − o(1) (defined as the ratio of leakage amount to secret-key size). The instantiations of our construction from the DDH and DCR assumptions result in LR-CCA secure PKEs with leakage rate of 1/2 − o(1). On the other hand, our construction also creates a new approach for constructing IND-CCA secure (leakage-free) PKE schemes, which may be of independent interest.
tags and the subset of lossy ones. If tag t = (t a , t c ) is injective, then so is the corresponding function LF F pk,t (·). If the tag is lossy, the output of the function reveals only a constant amount of information about its input X. For any t a , there exists a lossy tag (t a , t c ) such that t c can be efficiently computed through a trapdoor F td. Without this trapdoor, however, it is hard to generate a new lossy tag even with the knowledge of one lossy tag. Trapdoor F td and lossy tag are only used for the security proof.
Roughly speaking, a hash proof system HPS is a key-encapsulation mechanism. Given public key pk, an element C ∈ V and its witness w, the encapsulated key is given by K = HPS.Pub(pk, C, w). With secret key sk, decapsulation algorithm HPS.Priv(sk, C) recovers K from C ∈ V. If C ∈ C \ V, the output of HPS.Priv(sk, C) has a high min-entropy even conditioned on pk and C. The hardness of subset membership problem requires that elements in V are indistinguishable from those in C \ V.
In our construction, the secret key is just sk from the HPS, and the HPS and OT-LF are integrated into a ciphertext CT, CT = (C, s, Ψ = Ext(K, s) ⊕ M, Π = LF F pk,t (K), t c ), via K = HPS.Pub(pk, C, w) = HPS.Priv(sk, C) (it holds for all C ∈ V).
The encapsulated key K functions in two ways.
(1) It serves as an input, together with a random string s, to extractor Ext(K, s) to mask and hide the plaintext M to deal with key leakage. ( 2) It serves as the input of LF F pk,t (·) to check the well-formedness of the ciphertext. Tag t = (t a , t c ) is determined by t a = (C, s, Ψ) and a random t c . LF F pk,t (K) can also be considered as an authentication code, which is used to authenticate the tag t = ((C, s, Ψ), t c ) with the authentication key K.
In the security proof, some changes are made to the generation of the challenge ciphertext CT * = (C * , s * , Ψ * , Π * , t * c ): C * is sampled from C \ V and the tag t * is made lossy by computing a proper t c with trapdoor F td. A PPT adversary cannot tell the changes due to the hardness of subset membership problem and the indistinguishability of lossy tags and injective ones. Conditioned on CT * , the encapsulated key K * = HPS.Priv(sk, C * ) still maintains a high min-entropy since Π * = LF F pk,t * (K * ) works in lossy mode and only little information is released. When a PPT adversary chooses an invalid ciphertext CT in the sense that C ∈ C \ V for decryption query, the corresponding tag t is injective with overwhelming probability. Then LF F pk,t (·) is injective and Π preserves the high min-entropy of K = HPS.Priv(sk, C). Hence invalid ciphertexts will be rejected by the decryption oracle with overwhelming probability. On the other hand, the information of pk has already determined K = HPS.Priv(sk, C) for all C ∈ V. Thus the decryption oracle does not help the adversary to gain any more information about K * . Then an extractor can be applied to K * to totally mask the information of challenge plaintext, and a large min-entropy of K * conditioned on pk and Π * implies a high tolerance of key leakage. Thanks to efficient constructions for HPS and OT-LF under the DDH and DCR assumptions, the instantiations are practically efficient. More precisely, |K| ≈ L/2, where L is the length of the secret key of HPS. Due to the lossiness of the OT-LF and the property of the HPS, the min-entropy conditioned on the public key and challenge ciphertext, approaches (1/2 − o(1))L. Hence the leakage rate approaches 1/2.
Preliminaries
Notation. Let [n] denote the set {1, . . . , n}. Let κ ∈ N denote the security parameter and 1 κ denote the string of κ ones. If s is a string, then |s| denotes its length, while if S is a set then |S| denotes its size and s ← S denotes the operation of picking an element s uniformly at random from S. We denote y ← A(x) the operation of running A with input x, and assigning y as the result. We write log s for logarithms over the reals with base 2.
Randomness Extractor. Let SD(X, Y ) denote the statistical distance of random variables X and Y over domain Ω. Namely, SD(X, Y ) = The min-entropy of X is H ∞ (X) = − log(max ω∈Ω Pr[X = ω]). Dodis et al. [13] formalized the notion of average min-entropy of X conditioned on Y which is defined as H ∞ (X|Y ) = − log(E y←Y [2 −H∞(X|Y =y) ]). They proved the following property of average min-entropy. 
Definition 1 (Randomness Extractor
). An efficient function Ext : X × S → Y is an average-case (ν, )-strong extractor if for all pairs of random variables (X, Z) such that X ∈ X and H ∞ (X|Z) ≥ ν, we have SD((Z, s, Ext(X, s)), (Z, s, U Y )) ≤ , where s is uniform over S and U Y is uniform over Y.
A family of universal hash functions H = {H s : X → Y} s∈S can be used as an average-case ( H ∞ (X|Z), )-strong extractors whenever H ∞ (X|Z) ≥ log |Y| + 2 log(1/ ), according to the general Leftover Hash Lemma [13] .
Leakage-Resilient Public-Key Encryption
A Public-Key Encryption (PKE) scheme with plaintext space M is given by three PPT algorithms (PKE.Gen, PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec). The key generation algorithm PKE.Gen takes as input 1 κ , and outputs a pair of public/secret keys (P K, SK). The encryption algorithm PKE.Enc takes as input a public key P K and a plaintext M ∈ M, and returns a ciphertext CT = PKE.Enc(P K, M ). The decryption algorithm PKE.Dec takes as input a secret key SK and a ciphertext CT , and returns a plaintext M ∈ M ∪ {⊥ }. For consistency, we require that PKE.Dec(SK, PKE.Enc(P K, M )) = M holds for all (P K, SK) ← PKE.Gen(1 κ ) and all plaintexts M ∈ M. Following [27, 28] , we define leakage-resilient chosen-ciphertext security (LR-CCA) for PKE. 
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In the case of λ = 0, Definition 2 is just the standard CCA security [32] .
Hash Proof System
We recall the notion of hash proof systems introduced by Cramer and Shoup [9] . For simplicity, hash proof systems are described as key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs), as did in [21] .
Projective Hashing. Let SK, PK and K be sets of public keys, secret keys and encapsulated keys. Let C be the set of all ciphertexts of KEM and V ⊂ C be the set of all valid ones. We assume that there are efficient algorithms for sampling sk ← SK, C ← V together with a witness w, and C ← C \ V. Let Λ sk : C → K be a hash function indexed with sk ∈ SK that maps ciphertexts to symmetric keys. The hash function Λ sk is projective if there exists a projection µ : SK → PK such that µ(sk) ∈ PK defines the action of Λ sk over the subset V of valid ciphertexts.
Definition 3 (universal [9] ). A projective hash function Λ sk is -universal, if for all pk, C ∈ C \ V, and all K ∈ K, it holds that Pr[Λ sk (C) = K | (pk, C)] ≤ , where the probability is over all possible sk ← SK with pk = µ(sk).
The lemma below follows directly from the definition of min-entropy.
Lemma 2. Assume that Λ sk : C → K is an -universal projective hash function. Then, for all pk and C ∈ C \ V, it holds that H ∞ (Λ sk (C)|(pk, C)) ≥ log 1/ , where sk ← SK with pk = µ(sk).
Hash Proof System. A hash proof system HPS consists of three PPT algorithms (HPS.Gen, HPS.Pub, HPS.Priv). The parameter generation algorithm HPS.Gen(1 κ ) generates parameterized instances of the form params=(group, K, C, V, SK, PK, Λ (·) : C → K, µ : SK → PK), where group may contain additional structural parameters. The public evaluation algorithm HPS.Pub(pk, C, w) takes as input a projective public key pk = µ(sk), a valid ciphertext C ∈ V and a witness w of the fact that C ∈ V, and computes the encapsulated key K = Λ sk (C). The private evaluation algorithm HPS.Priv(sk, C) takes a secret key sk and a ciphertext C ∈ V as input, and returns the encapsulated key K = Λ sk (C) without knowing a witness. We assume that µ and Λ (·) are efficiently computable.
Subset Membership Problem. The subset membership problem associated with a HPS suggests that a random valid ciphertext C 0 ← V and a random invalid ciphertext C 1 ← C \ V are computationally indistinguishable. This is formally captured by a negligible advantage function Adv smp HPS,A (κ) for all PPT adversary A, where
Definition 4. A hash proof system HPS = (HPS.Gen, HPS.Pub, HPS.Priv) is -universal if: (i) for all sufficiently large κ ∈ N and for all possible outcomes of HPS.Gen(1 κ ), the underlying projective hash function is (κ)-universal for negligible (κ); (ii) the underlying subset membership problem is hard. Furthermore, a hash proof system is called perfectly universal if (κ) = 1/|K|.
One-time Lossy Filter
One-time Lossy Filter (OT-LF) is a simplified version of lossy algebraic filters recently introduced by Hofheinz [19] . A (Dom, LF )-OT-LF is a family of functions indexed by a public key F pk and a tag t. A function LF F pk,t from the family maps an input X ∈ Dom to an output LF F pk,t (X). Given public key F pk, the set of tags T contains two computationally indistinguishable disjoint subsets, namely the subset of injective tags T inj and the subset of lossy ones T loss . If t is an injective tag, the function LF F pk,t is injective and has image size of |Dom|. If t is lossy, the output of the function has image size at most 2 LF . Thus, a lossy tag ensures that LF F pk,t (X) reveals at most LF bits of information about its input X. This is a crucial property of an LF. Key Generation. LF.Gen(1 κ ) outputs a key pair (F pk, F td). The public key F pk defines a tag space T = {0, 1} * × T c that contains two disjoint subsets, the subset of lossy tags T loss ⊆ T and that of injective tags T inj ⊆ T . A tag t = (t a , t c ) ∈ T consists of an auxiliary tag t a ∈ {0, 1} * and a core tag t c ∈ T c . F td is a trapdoor that allows to efficiently sample a lossy tag.
Evaluation. LF.Eval(F pk, t, X), for a public key F pk, a tag t and X ∈ Dom, computes LF F pk,t (X).
Lossy Tag Generation. LF.LTag(F td, t a ), for an auxiliary tag t a and the trapdoor F td, computes a core tag t c such that t = (t a , t c ) is lossy. We require that an OT-LF LF has the following properties:
Lossiness. If t is injective, so is the function LF F pk,t (·). If t is lossy, then LF F pk,t (X) has image size of at most 2 LF . (In application, we are interested in OT-LFs that have a constant parameter LF even for larger domain.) Indistinguishability. For any PPT adversary A, it is hard to distinguish a lossy tag from a random tag, i.e., the following advantage is negligible in κ.
where (F pk, F td) ← LF.Gen(1 κ ), t a ← A(F pk), t
c ← LF.LTag(F td, t a ) and t
Evasiveness. For any PPT adversary A, it is hard to generate a non-injective tag 1 even given a lossy tag, i.e., the following advantage is negligible in κ.
The definition of one-time lossy filter is different from that of lossy algebraic filter [19] in two ways. First, the one-time property in our definition allows the adversary to query lossy tag generation oracle only once in both indistinguishability and evasiveness games. While in [19] , the adversary is allowed to query the oracle polynomial times. Secondly, unlike lossy algebraic filter, one-time lossy filter does not require any algebraic properties.
Chameleon Hashing
A chameleon hashing function [22] is essentially a hashing function associated with a pair of evaluation key and trapdoor. Its collision-resistant property holds when only the evaluation key of the function is known, but is broken with the trapdoor. We recall the formal definition of chameleon hashing from [18] .
Definition 6 (Chameleon Hashing).
A chameleon hashing function CH consists of three PPT algorithms (CH.Gen, CH.Eval, CH.Equiv):
Key Generation. CH.Gen(1 κ ) outputs an evaluation key ek ch and a trapdoor td ch .
Evaluation. CH.Eval(ek ch , x; r ch ) maps x ∈ {0, 1} * to y ∈ Y with help of the evaluation key ek ch and a randomness r ch ← R ch . If r ch is uniformly distributed over R ch , so is y over Y.
Equivocation. CH.Equiv(td ch , x, r ch , x ) outputs a randomness r ch ∈ R ch such that CH.Eval(ek ch , x; r ch ) = CH.Eval(ek ch , x ; r ch ),
for all x, x and r ch . Meanwhile, r ch is uniformly distributed as long as r ch is.
Collision Resistance. Given evaluation key ek ch , it is hard to find (x, r ch ) = (x , r ch ) with CH.Eval(ek ch , x; r ch ) = CH.Eval(ek ch , x ; r ch ). More precisely, for any PPT adversary A, the following advantage is negligible in κ.
The Construction
Let HPS = (HPS.Gen, HPS.Pub, HPS.Priv) be an 1 -universal hash proof system, where HPS.Gen(1 κ ) generates instances of params=(group, K, C, V, SK, PK, Λ (·) : C → K, µ : SK → PK). Let LF = (LF.Gen, LF.Eval, LF.LTag) be a (K, LF )-one-time lossy filter. Define ν := log(1/ 1 ). Let λ be a bound on the amount of leakage, and let Ext : K×{0, 1} d → {0, 1} m be an average-case (ν−λ− LF , 2 )-strong extractor. We assume that 2 is negligible in κ. The encryption scheme PKE = (PKE.Gen, PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec) with plaintext space {0, 1} m is described as follows.
Key Generation. PKE.Gen(1 κ ) runs HPS.Gen(1 κ ) to obtain params and runs LF.Gen(1 κ ) to obtain (F pk, F td). It also picks sk ← SK and sets pk = µ(sk). The output is a public/secret key pair (P K, SK), where P K = (params, F pk, pk) and SK = sk.
Encryption. PKE.Enc(P K, M ) takes as input a public key P K and a message M ∈ {0, 1} m . It chooses C ← V with witness w, a random seed s ← {0, 1}
d and a random core tag t c ← T c . It then computes
where the filter tag is t = (t a , t c ) with t a = (C, s, Ψ). Output the ciphertext CT = (C, s, Ψ, Π, t c ).
Decryption. PKE.Dec(SK, CT ), given a secret key SK = sk and a ciphertext CT = (C, s, Ψ, Π, t c ), computes K = HPS.Priv(sk, C) and Π = LF F pk,t (K ), where t = ((C, s, Ψ), t c ). It checks whether Π = Π . If not, it rejects with ⊥.
The correctness of PKE follows from the correctness of the underlying hash proof system. The idea of our construction is to employ a Hash Proof System (HPS) to generate an encapsulated key K, which is then used not only to mask the plaintext, but also to verify the well-formedness of the ciphertext. To deal with the secret key leakage, an extractor converts K to a shorter key to hide the plaintext M . A one-time lossy filter LF F pk,t (K) helps to implement the verification. The filter in the challenge ciphertext CT * works in the lossy mode, and it leaks only a limited amount of information about the key K. For any invalid ciphertext submitted by the adversary to the decryption oracle, the filter works in the injective mode with overwhelming probability. Consequently, the output of the filter in the invalid ciphertext preserves the entropy of K, which makes the ciphertext rejected by the decryption oracle with overwhelming probability.
The security of the construction is established by the theorem below.
Theorem 1.
Assuming that HPS is an 1 -universal hash proof system, LF is a (K, LF )-one-time lossy filter, and Ext :
-strong extractor, the encryption scheme PKE is λ-LR-CCA-secure as long as λ ≤ ν − m − LF − ω(log κ), where m is the plaintext length and ν := log(1/ 1 ). Particularly,
where Q(κ) denotes the number of decryption queries made by A.
Parameters and leakage rate. To make our construction tolerate leakage as much as possible, it is useful to consider a "very strong" hash proof system (i.e., 1 ≤ 2/|K|). In this case, ν = log(1/ 1 ) ≥ log |K| − 1. Thus, when K is sufficiently large, the leakage rate (defined as λ/|SK|) in our construction approaches (log |K|)/|SK| asymptotically.
CCA-security. Clearly, if λ = 0 and log(1/ 1 ) ≥ m + LF + ω(log κ), the above construction is CCAsecure. Thus, it provides a new approach for constructing CCA-secure PKE from any universal hash proof system and OT-LF.
Proof. The proof goes with game arguments [33] . We define a sequence of games, Game 0 , . . . , Game 6 , played between a simulator Sim and a PPT adversary A. In each game, the adversary outputs a bit b as a guess of the random bit b used by the simulator. Denote by S i the event that b = b in Game i and denote by CT * = (C * , s * , Ψ * , Π * , t * c ) the challenge ciphertext. Game 0 : This is the original LR-CCA game Exp lr-cca PKE,A (κ). The simulator generates the public/secret key pair (P K, SK) by invoking PKE.Gen(1 κ ) and sends the public key P K to the adversary A. For each decryption query CT or leakage query f i , Sim responds with PKE.Dec(SK, CT ) or f i (SK) using secret key SK. Upon receiving two messages M 0 , M 1 of equal length from the adversary, Sim selects a random b ∈ {0, 1} and sends the challenge ciphertext CT * := PKE.Enc(P K, M b ) to A. The simulator continues to answer the adversary's decryption query as long as CT = CT * . Finally, A outputs a bit b , which is a guess of b. By the Definition 2, we have Adv Game 2 : This game is exactly like Game 1 , except that a special rejection rule applies to the decryption oracle. If the adversary queries a ciphertext CT = (C, s, Ψ, Π, t c ) such that t = (t a , t c ) = (t * a , t * c ) = t * , then the decryption oracle immediately outputs ⊥ and halts. For convenient, we call such tag a copied LF tag. We show that a decryption query with a copied LF tag is rejected in decryption oracles in both Game 1 and Game 2 . We consider the following two cases.
• case 1: Π = Π * . This implies CT = CT * . In this case the decryption oracles in Game 1 and Game 2 proceed identically since A is not allowed to ask for the decryption of challenge ciphertext.
• case 2: 
A straightforward reduction to the indistinguishability of the subset membership problem yields |Pr[
This game is the same as Game 4 , except that another special rejection rule is applied to the decryption oracle. If the adversary queries a ciphertext CT = (C, s, Ψ, Π, t c ) for decryption such that C ∈ C \ V, then the decryption oracle immediately outputs ⊥ . Let bad C be the event that a ciphertext is rejected in Game 5 that would not have been rejected under the rules of Game 4 . Then Game 5 and Game 4 proceed identically until event bad C occurs. We have
by the difference lemma of [33] . We show the following lemma shortly (after the main proof), which guarantees that bad C occurs with a negligible probability.
Lemma 3. Suppose that the adversary A makes at most Q(κ) decryption queries. Then
where B is a suitable adversary attacking on LF's evasiveness.
This game is exactly like Game 5 , except for the generation of Ψ * in CT * . In this game, Sim chooses Ψ * uniformly at random from {0, 1} m instead of using
Claim 1. For C * ← C \ V if the decryption algorithm rejects all invalid ciphertexts, then the value Λ sk (C * ) has average min-entropy at least ν − λ − LF ≥ ω(log κ) + m given all the other values in A's view (denoted by view A ).
We prove Claim 1 by directly analyzing the average min-entropy of Λ sk (C * ) from the adversary's point of view. Since all invalid ciphertexts are rejected by the decryption oracle in both Game 5 and Game 6 , A cannot learn more information on the value Λ sk (C * ) from the decryption oracle other than pk, C * , Π * and the key leakage. Recall that Π * has only 2 LF possible vales and H ∞ (Λ sk (C * ) | (pk, C * )) ≥ ν (which holds for all pk and C * ∈ C \ V). Hence,
Applying an average-
Observe that in Game 6 , the challenge ciphertext is completely independent of the random coin b picked by the simulator. Thus, Pr[
Putting all together, Theorem 1 follows.
It remains to prove Lemma 3. We do it now.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let F be the event that in Game 4 there exists a decryption query CT = (C, s, Ψ, Π, t c ), such that t = ((C, s, Ψ), t c ) is a non-injective, non-copied tag. We have
Thus, it suffices to prove the following two claims: Claim 2 and Claim 3.
Claim 2. Suppose that the adversary A makes at most Q(κ) decryption queries. If LF is a one-time lossy filter, then
where B is a suitable adversary on LF's evasiveness.
Proof. Given a challenge LF evaluation key F * pk , B simulates A's environment in Game 4 as follows. It generates the PKE's public key P K as in Game 4 but sets F pk = F * pk . Note that B can use PKE's secret key to deal with A's decryption queries. To simulate the challenge ciphertext (in which the LF tag should be lossy), B queries its lossy tag generation oracle once with t * a = (C * , s * , Ψ * ) to proceed t * c , where (C * , s * , Ψ * ) are generated as in Game 4 . Finally, B chooses i ∈ [Q(k)] uniformly, and outputs the tag t = ((C, s, Ψ), t c ) extracted from A's i-th decryption query (C, s, Ψ, Π, t c ). Clearly, if the event F occurs, with probability at least 1/Q(κ), t is a non-injective tag. That is
Claim 3. Suppose that the adversary A makes at most Q(κ) decryption queries. If HPS is 1 -universal, then
where ν = log(1/ 1 ).
Proof. Suppose that CT = (C, s, Ψ, Π, t c ) is the first ciphertext that makes bad C happen given F , i.e. C ∈ C \ V but Π = LF F pk,t (Λ sk (C)), where t = ((C, s, Ψ), t c ) is an injective LF tag. For simplicity, we call CT = (C, s, Ψ, Π, t c ) an invalid ciphertext if C ∈ C \ V. Denote by view A the adversary's view prior to submitting the first invalid ciphertext. Observe that only pk, the challenge ciphertext CT * , and the key leakage of at most λ bits reveal information of the secret key to the adversary. According to Lemma 1, we have
Eq. (8) (9) follows from the fact that for all pk and C ∈ C \ V, H ∞ (Λ sk (C) | (pk, C)) ≥ log(1/ 1 ) = ν , which is due to the 1 -universal property of HPS and Lemma 2. The fact that event F does not occur implies that t = ((C, s, Ψ), t c ) is an injective tag. Applying an injective function to a distribution preserves its min-entropy, we have
Thus, in Game 4 the decryption algorithm accepts the first invalid ciphertext with probability at most 2 λ+ LF +m /2 ν . Observe that the adversary can rule out one more value of K from each rejection of invalid ciphertext. So, the decryption algorithm accepts the i-th invalid ciphertext with probability at most 2 λ+ LF +m /(2 ν − i + 1). Since A makes at most Q(κ) decryption queries, it follows that
which is negligible in
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
Instantiation from the DDH Assumption
This section is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, we present a variant of hash proof system from the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption [9] . In Section 4.2, we introduce an efficient DDH-based OT-LF. In Section 4.3, we apply the construction in Section 3 to the two building blocks and obtain an efficient DDH-based LR-CCA secure PKE scheme, depicted in Fig. 1 . In Section 4.4, we show a comparison of our scheme with some existing LR-CCA secure PKE schemes.
The DDH Assumption. We assume a PPT algorithm G(1 κ ) that takes as input 1 κ and outputs a tuple of G = q, G, g , where G is a cyclic group of prime order q and g is a generator of G. The Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption holds iff
is negligible in κ for any PPT adversary D, where g 1 , g 2 ← G, r ← Z q and r ← Z q \ {r}.
A DDH-based HPS
Let q, G, g ← G(1 κ ) and let g 1 , g 2 be two random generators of G. Choose n ∈ N. We assume there is an efficient injective mapping Inj :
Clearly, Inj is also an injection. We define a hash proof system HPS 1 = (HPS 1 .Gen, HPS 1 .Pub, HPS 1 .Priv) below.
The parameter params = (group, K, C, V, SK, PK, Λ sk , µ) is set up as follows.
•
: r ∈ Z q } with witness set W = Z q .
2 ) i∈[n] .
• For all C = (u 1 , u 2 ) ∈ C, define Λ sk (C) = Inj((u xi,1
The public evaluation and private evaluation algorithms are defined as follows:
∈ V with witness r ∈ Z q , define HPS 1 .Pub(pk, C, r) = Inj(pk r 1 , . . . , pk r n ).
• For all C = (u 1 , u 2 ) ∈ C, define HPS 1 .Priv(sk, C) = Λ sk (C).
Correctness of HPS 1 follows directly by the definitions of µ and Λ sk . The subset membership problem in HPS 1 is hard because of the DDH assumption. If n = 1, this is just the DDH-based hash proof system introduced by Cramer and Shoup with encapsulated key set K = Z q , and is known to be perfectly universal [9, 21] . We have the following theorem with proof in Appendix A.
Theorem 2. For any n ∈ N, HPS 1 is perfectly universal under the DDH assumption with encapsulated key size |K| = q n .
A DDH-based OT-LF
We use the following notations. If A = (A i,j ) is an n × n matrix over Z q , and g is an element of q-order group G. Then g A denotes the n × n matrix ( g Ai,j ) over G. Given a vector X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) ∈ Z n q and an n × n matrix E = (E i,j ) ∈ G n×n , define
Let CH = (CH.Gen, CH.Eval, CH.Equiv) define a chameleon hashing function with image set Z q . The OT-LF is LF 1 = (LF 1 .Gen, LF 1 .Eval, LF 1 .LTag), as shown below.
Key Generation. LF 1 .Gen(1 κ ) runs G(1 κ ) to obtain G = q, G, g and runs CH.Gen(1 κ ) to obtain (ek ch , td ch ). Pick a random pair (t * a , t * c ) ← {0, 1} * × R ch and compute b * = CH.Eval(ek ch , t * a ; t * c ). Choose r 1 , . . . , r n , s 1 , . . . , s n ← Z q , and compute an n×n matrix A = (A i,j ) ∈ Z n×n q with A i,j = r i s j for i, j ∈ [n]. Compute matrix E = g A−b * I ∈ G n×n , where I is the n × n identity matrix over Z q . Finally, output F pk = ( q, G, g, ek ch , E) and F td = (td ch , t * a , t * c ). The tag space is defined as T = {0, 1} * × R ch , where T loss = {(t a , t c ) : (t a , t c ) ∈ T ∧ CH.Eval(ek ch , t a ; t c ) = b * } and
Evaluation. For a tag t = (t a , t c ) ∈ {0, 1} * ×R ch and an input X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) ∈ Z n q , LF 1 .Eval(F pk, t, X) first computes b = CH.Eval(ek ch , t a ; t c ) and outputs
where "⊗" denotes the operation of entry-wise multiplication.
Lossy Tag Generation. For an auxiliary tag t a , LF 1 .LTag(F td, t a ) computes a core tag t c = CH.Equiv(td ch , t * a , t * c , t a ) with the trapdoor F td = (td ch , t * a , t * c ). 
The DDH-based PKE Scheme
Let G = q, G, g and G = q, G, g be two group descriptions. Suppose n ∈ N satisfies n log q ≥ log q + λ + m + ω(log κ). Set n = n log q/ log q . Let (ek ch , td ch ) ← CH.Gen(1 κ ) be a chameleon hash function with image set Z q . Let Ext : Z n q × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} m be an average-case (n log q − log q − λ, 2 )-strong extractor. Applying the general construction in Section 3 to the aforementioned DDH-based HPS and OT-LF, we obtain a DDH-based PKE scheme in Fig. 1 . 
Encryption. PKE 1 .Enc(P K, M ): For a public key P K and a message M ∈ {0, 1} m , it chooses r ← Z q and s ← {0, 1}
d . Compute
where b = CH.Eval(ek ch , t a ; t c ) for the auxiliary tag t a = (C, s, Ψ) and a random filter core tag t c ∈ R ch . Note that in the computation of Π, K is regarded as a vector of dimension n over Z q (this works well since n log q ≤ n log q).
Decryption. Theorem 4. If the DDH assumptions hold in groups G and G, and the CH is a chameleon hash function, then PKE 1 is λ-LR-CCA secure if λ ≤ n log q−log q−m−ω(log κ) (i.e., n ≥ (λ+log q+m+ω(log κ))/ log q). In particular, the leakage rate in PKE 1 is 1/2 − o(1) and
where Q(κ) is the number of decryption queries made by A.
Proof. Theorem 2 showed that the underlying HPS in PKE 1 is perfectly universal (i.e., 1 = 1/q n ). Theorem 3 said that the underlying filter is a ( q n , log q)-OT-LF. Consequently, PKE 1 is λ-LR-CCA secure according to Theorem 1. If the parameter n in PKE 1 increases, with q, m fixed, λ/|SK| = (n log q −log q − m − ω(log κ))/(2n log q) = 1/2 − o(1).
Efficiency Discussion
In this section, we show a comparison of our DDH-based PKE scheme with the existing DDH/DLIN based LR-CCA secure PKE schemes [28, 25, 11, 16] in terms of leakage rate and ciphertext overhead (defined as the difference between the ciphertext length and the embedded message length). Note that the GHV12 scheme is obtained by applying the CHK transformation to the mKDM-sID-CPA secure scheme (#G) GHV12 [16] n log q λ ≤ n log q − 3 log q − 2 (κ) 2n + 6 NS09 [28] 6 log q λ ≤ log q − ω(log κ) − m 3 LZSS12 [25] 4 log q λ ≤ log q − ω(log κ) − m 3 Ours 2n log q λ ≤ n log q − log q − m − ω(log κ) n + 2 [16] . The GHV12 scheme is LR-CCA secure only if the mKDM-sID-CPA secure scheme [16] is master-key leakage sID-CPA secure. In fact, Galindo et.al. claimed their mKDM-sID-CPA secure scheme is masterkey leakage sID-CPA secure with leakage rate 1 − o(1), but without any rigorous proof. We personally regard that proving that claim is very hard, since the proof involves constructing a PPT simulator to answer not only key leakage queries, but also identities' private key queries. Nevertheless, we include the GHV12 scheme in the comparison. For simplicity, in a ciphertext, we only consider the length of group elements, ignoring the constant length non-group elements, e.g., the seed used in a randomness extractor. We also assume that elements in q-order group can be encoded as bit strings of length log q. To be fair, like in [11, Theorem 6], we will consider the ciphertext overhead (shorted as "CT overhead") under any fixed and achievable leakage rate. We begin by giving an overview of the secret key size (shorted as "SK size"), the amount of absolute leakage and the number of group elements in the ciphertexts of the PKE schemes [28, 25, 16] in Table 1 . In table 1, κ is the security parameter; q , q and q are group sizes; m is the message length and n is a parameter as in Fig. 1 and [16, Section 5]. In our scheme, n = n log q/ log q . So, the bit-length of n elements in group G equals that of n elements in group G. We observe that in our scheme as well as that of [11, 16] the group size (i.e. q and q) remains constant even with larger leakage. While in [28] and [25] , both of them rely on increasing the group size (i.e., q ) to tolerate larger leakage. So, it is more reasonable to compare the bit-length of ciphertext overhead rather than the number of group elements for the same leakage rate. As an example, we give the concrete relations between ciphertext overhead and leakage-rate of our scheme. In our scheme, for a security level (κ), we can choose |q| = | q| = 2 (κ). From [13] , applying a universal hash function to a source with 3 (κ) entropy suffices to extract (κ)-bit random key that is 2 − (κ) -close to a uniform distribution over {0, 1} (κ) . So, we can set ω(log κ) = 2 (κ) and m = (κ). According to Theorem 4, the amount of leakage is bounded by (2n−5) (κ). Thus, for any δ ∈ [0, 1/2), the leakage rate in our scheme achieves δ, as long as n ≥ 5/(2 − 4δ) (i.e., λ ≤ (κ)(2 5/(2 − 4δ) − 5)) and the ciphertext overhead is ( 5/(2 − 4δ) + 2)2 (κ) bits (ignoring the seed and the core tag part).
Similarly, we can compute the other schemes' ciphertext overheads for reasonable leakage rates. We summarize these results in Table 2 .
Finally, we give a quantitative comparison among these LR-CCA secure PKE schemes in Table 3 . While for some achievable leakage rate (e.g., δ ≤ 0.4), our scheme is more efficient compared with the other four schemes. As our construction is general, we can also instantiate it under other standard assumptions, e.g., the DCR assumption [29, 10] . In [16] , the scheme is obtained by applying the CHK transformation [6] to a master-key leakage resilient identity-based encryption scheme. To the best of our knowledge, the constructions of identity-based PKE schemes [16, 24] with master-key leakage-resilience 
Instantiation from the DCR Assumption
Here we present a PKE scheme instantiated under the Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) assumption [29] . The underlying HPS and OT-LF are given in Appendix C and Appendix D.
Definition 7 (The DCR Assumption [29, 10] ). We assume a PPT algorithm IG(1 κ ) that on input 1 κ generates a Blum integer N = P Q = (2P + 1)(2Q + 1) such that P , Q, P and Q are all primes (i.e., P and Q are safe primes). In addition, we require that P and Q are two distinct primes of length (κ). For any n ≥ 1, the n-Decisional Composite Residuosity assumption (n-DCR for short) holds iff
is negligible in κ for any PPT adversary D, where N ← IG(1 κ ), x ← Z * N n+1 and a ← Z N n . In fact, the DCR assumption is assumed to hold for all RSA modulus. Moreover, Damgård and Jurik [10] have shown that all n-DCR assumptions are equivalent for n ∈ N.
Besides the DCR assumption, we also need the following assumption.
Definition 8.
[18] For any PPT adversary A,
is negligible in κ, where N ← IG(1 κ ).
In the Paillier cryptosystem [29] , each ciphertext of a plaintext a ∈ Z N has the form , N ) < N , the above assumption actually stipulates that it is infeasible to generate Paillier encryptions of "funny messages". Note that knowing such message allows to factor N .
Let N ← IG(1 κ ) and N ← IG(1 κ ), where N = P Q = (2P + 1)(2Q + 1) and N = P Q = (2 P + 1)(2 Q + 1). Suppose the message space is {0, 1} m . Let n be a positive integer such that n(log N − 1) ≥ log N + λ + m + ω(log κ). Set n = n log N/ log N . Let (ek ch , td ch ) ← CH.Gen(1 κ ) be a chameleon hash function with image set {0,
m be an average-case (n(log N − 1) − log N − λ, 2 )-strong extractor, where 2 is a negligible function in κ. Each element y ∈ Z * N 2 can be uniquely represented as y = a + bN mod N 2 (0 ≤ a, b ≤ N − 1), and gcd(a, N ) = 1 must hold. Now define a map χ(y) = b ∈ Z N . For any fixed y, if c ranges over {0, . . . , N − 1}, then χ(y (1 + N ) c ) ranges over Z N as well, as shown in [9] . Applying the transformation from Section 3 to the DCR-based HPS (in Appendix C) and OT-LF (in Appendix D), we obtain a PKE scheme which is presented in Fig. 2 . N, n, pk 1 , . . . , pk n , g, N , n, E, ek ch ) and SK = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) . Encryption. PKE 2 .Enc(P K, M ): For a public key P K and a message M ∈ {0, 1} m , choose a random r ∈ {0, . . . , N/2 } and a random seed s ∈ {0, 1} d . It then computes
where b = CH.Eval(ek ch , t a ; t c ) for the auxiliary tag t a = (C, s, Ψ) and a random filter core tag t c ∈ R ch . Return CT = (C, s, Ψ, Π, t c ). Note that in the computation of Π, K is considered as an element in Z N n . , and CH is a chameleon hash function, then PKE 2 is λ-LR-CCA secure for any λ ≤ n(log N −1)−log N −m−ω(log κ). In particular, the leakage rate in PKE 2 can approach 1/2 and
Proof. The proof of Theorem 5 is given in Appendix E.
Conclusion and Further Work
We present a new generic construction of a public-key encryption scheme secure against leakage-resilient chosen-ciphertext attacks, from any -universal HPS and any one-time lossy filter (OT-LF). Instantiations from the DDH and DCR assumptions show that our construction is practical and achieves leakage rate of 1/2 − o(1). When a slightly weaker universality property of HPS holds with overwhelming probability over the choice of C from the invalid set, LR-CPA security with leakage rate of 1 − o(1) can be easily constructed from HPS [27] . In our construction, the HPS is required to be -universal for the worst-case choice of C from the invalid set C \ V. That is the reason why those LR-CPA security with leakage rate of 1 − o(1) from some HPS cannot be converted into LR-CCA security with OT-LF. The open question is how to further improve leakage rate while keeping the practicality of PKE.
A Proof of Theorem 2
Sketch. To show that HPS 1 is perfectly universal, it suffices to show that for all C = (u 1 , u 2 ) ∈ C \ V, Λ sk (C) is uniformly distributed over K conditioned on any fixed public key pk.
2 , then Λ sk (C) = (Inj (Λ 1 (C) ), . . . , Inj(Λ n (C))). Given pk = (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ) and Λ sk (C), we have
. . .
. .
where α = log g1 g 2 , r 1 = log g1 u 1 and r 2 = log g1 u 2 . Since r 1 = r 2 , we have det(A) = α n (r 2 − r 1 ) n = 0. Further more, by the fact that (
n , it holds that each Λ i (C) has a uniform distribution over G. Since Inj : G → Z q is an injection, this implies that Inj(Λ i (C)) leads to a uniform distribution on Z q . Thus, given any specific pk and C ∈ C \ V,
B Proof of Theorem 3
Sketch. To prove this theorem, it suffices to prove its lossiness, indistinguishability and evasiveness.
Lossiness. Define (y 1 , . . . , y n ) :
More precisely,
X·B is an injective function. On the other hand, if t ∈ T loss , then b = b * . Hence B = A + (b − b * )I is a matrix of rank 1. Obviously, LF 1 .Eval(F pk, t, X) = g X·B has only q distinct values. So, LF1 = log q.
Indistinguishability. Firstly, we define the following problem. Given a group G, g, q , let
, where r i , s j ← Z q , and E (1) be the same as
. We claim (with a deferred proof) that for any PPT distinguisher D,
Then
Next, we prove that if a PPT adversary A can distinguish a lossy tag from an injective one, then
The theorem follows directly from Eq. (13) and (14) . To prove (14), we construct a PPT distinguisher D, who is given ( G, g, q, E (η) ) and try to determine η is 0 or 1 with help of A. D simulates the LF 1 environment for A as follows.
• Choose a chameleon hash function CH = (CH.Gen, CH.Eval, CH.Equiv), run (ek ch , td ch ) ← CH.Gen(1 κ ) and compute b * = CH.Eval(ek ch , t * a ; t * c ) for a random tag (t * a , t * c ).
F td = (td ch , t * a ; t * c ) and sends F pk = ( q, G, g, ek ch , E) to A.
• D responds A's query t a with t c ← LF.LTag(F td, t a ) = CH.Equiv(td ch , t * a , t * c , t a ).
• If A outputs 0, which means (t a , t c ) is a lossy tag, D outputs 0, indicating that
is not lossy, and t c is uniformly distributed by CH's property of equivocation. This concludes the proof of Eq. (14) .
Now it remains to prove Eq. (11) and (12) . For any D who aims to distinguish E (0) and E (1) , we proceeds with a series of games.
In
with
Now we show that Game −1 and Game are indistinguishable due to the DDH assumption. Let B be a DDH distinguisher, who is going to determine whether ( g, g
x , g y , T ) is a DDH tuple or not over group G of order q. B simulates an environment for D. B chooses r i , s j , z i ∈ Z q for i, j ∈ [n], i, j = , and computeŝ Game 1 : It is the original evasiveness game between adversary A and a challenger. The challenger calls LF 1 .Gen(1 κ ) to obtain F pk = ( q, G, g, ek ch , E) and F td = (td ch , t * a , t * c ).
• The challenger sends F pk to A;
• A queries with t a (only once), and the challenger answers with
• A outputs (t a , t c ).
Next, we show that any PPT adversary A that produces CH.Eval(ek ch , t a ; t c ) = b * − Tr(A) can be used to compute discrete logarithms in G of order q, hence contradicting the DDH assumption. Given a discrete logarithm challenge ( g, g x ) ∈ G 2 , a PPT algorithm B is going to compute the value of x with help of A. Now B simulates an environment for A.
• Choose a chameleon hash function CH = (CH.Gen, CH.Eval, CH.Equiv), run (ek ch , td ch ) ← CH.Gen(1 κ ) and compute b * = CH.Eval(ek ch , t * a ; t * c ) for a random tag (t * a , t * c ). Choose r 2 , . . . , r n , s 1 , . . . , s n ∈ Z q , and compute E = (E i,j ) ∈ G n×n , where
B keeps F td = (td ch , t * a ; t * c ) and sends F pk = ( q, G, g, ek ch , E) to A.
• B responds A's query t a with t c ← LF.LTag(F td, t a ) = CH.Equiv(td ch , t * a , t * c , t a ).
It is easy to see that B gives a perfect simulation for A by implicitly setting r 1 = x. Since 
Game 2 : It is the same as Game 1 , except for the response of the challenger to A'query t a . In this game, the challenger chooses t c ← R ch instead of computing it with LF 1 .LTag(F td, t a ).
Next, we will show any difference between the two events coll 1 and coll 2 results in a distinguisher D against the indistinguishability of LF 1 and
Suppose that D is a distinguisher in the indistinguishability game of LF 1 . D is given F pk, and has one oracle access with its own choice of t a . Given the response t c from the oracle, D tells whether (t a , t c ) is a lossy tag or not. Now D simulates an environment for A.
• D sends F pk to A.
• When A presents a query of t a , D transfers t a to it's own oracle, and sends the oracle's answer t c back to A.
• 
Combining (17) (19)(20) and (21) concludes the proof.
C A DCR-based HPS
Let N ← IG(1 κ ), where N = P Q = (2P + 1)(2Q + 1), P and Q are distinct random primes of length (κ). P = 2P + 1 and Q = 2Q + 1 are also primes. Let N = P Q . The group Z * N 2 can be decomposed as an internal direct product Z * N 2 = G N × G N × G 2 × T , where G i denotes a cyclic group of order i and T the subgroup generated by (−1 mod N 2 ). Define G 2N N := G N × G N × T and G 2N := G N × T . Then G 2N N is a cyclic group of order 2N N and G 2N is a cyclic group of order 2N . Choose a random h ← Z * N 2 and set g = −h 2N mod N 2 . It is easy to see that g is a generator of G 2N with overwhelming probability. Next, we describe a hash proof system HPS 2 = (HPS 2 .Gen, HPS 2 .Pub, HPS 2 .Priv).
The parameter generation algorithm HPS 2 .Gen(1 κ ) generates a parameterized instance params = (group, K, C, V, SK, PK, Λ sk , µ) in the following way.
• Choose n ∈ N. Set group = N, g, n , C = G 2N N and V = G 2N with witness W = {0, . . . , N/2 }.
• Let K = Z n N , and SK = {0, . . . , N 2 /2 } n , PK = G n 2N .
• For sk = (x i ) n i=1 ∈ SK, define pk = (pk i ) i∈[n] = µ(sk) = (g xi ) i∈ [n] .
• For all C ∈ C, define Λ sk (C) = (χ(C xi )) i∈ [n] . Recall that χ(y) = b ∈ Z N if y = a + bN ∈ Z N 2 .
• For all C ∈ V with witness r ∈ W , define HPS 2 .Pub(pk, C, r) = (χ(pk r 1 ), . . . , χ(pk r n )).
• For all C ∈ C, define HPS 2 .Priv(sk, C) = Λ sk (C) = (χ(C xi ))
Correctness directly follows by the definitions of µ and Λ sk . The subset membership problem in HPS 2 is hard under the DCR assumption. Next, we discuss its universal property. Let C = {C : C = g r (1+N ) a ∈ C \V ∧ gcd(a, N ) = 1}. Under the Assumption 8, any PPT adversary A, without the factorization information of N , outputs C ∈ C with probability at most Adv Thus, it suffices to discuss the universal property of HPS 2 for all C ∈ (C \C )\V. According to the analysis of the DCR-based HPS by Cramer and Shoup [9] , HPS 2 can be easily proved to be n2 − (κ) universal. Then Lemma 2 gives H ∞ (Λ sk (C) | (pk, C)) ≥ (κ) − log n − 1. As a matter of fact, the lower bound can be improved significantly.
Theorem 6. For all pk = µ(sk) and all C ∈ (C \ C ) \ V, H ∞ (Λ sk (C) | (pk, C)) ≥ n(log N − 1).
Proof. For n = 1, observe that if sk is sampled uniformly from the ideal key space SK * = {0, . . . , 2N N − 1}, then Λ sk (C) is uniformly distributed over Z N for all C ∈ (C \ C ) \ V. However, elements cannot be readily chosen uniformly at random from SK * without N . Instead, we choose elements from the set SK = {0, . For n ≥ 1, the HPS can be viewed as n independent copies of the case n = 1. Thus, the entropy will be n(log N − 1)-bit.
D A DCR-based OT-LF
The DCR-based OT-LF LF 2 = (LF 2 .Gen, LF 2 .Eval, LF 2 .LTag) is defined as follows.
Key Generation. . Finally, output F pk = ( N , n, ek ch , E) and F td = (td ch , t * a , t * c ). The tag space is defined as T = {0, 1} * × R ch . The lossy tag is defined as T loss = {(t a , t c ) : (t a , t c ) ∈ T ∧ CH.Eval(ek ch , t a ; t c ) = b * }. Particularly, T inj = T \ T loss .
Evaluation. For a tag t = (t a , t c ) ∈ {0, 1} * × R ch and an input X ∈ Z N n , LF 2 .Eval(F pk, t, X) computes
where b = CH.Eval(ek ch , t a ; t c )
Clearly, if t ∈ T inj , then gcd(b − b * , N ) = 1. Hence, the order of E(1 + N ) b is at least N n . So, LF 2 .Eval(F pk, t, X) computes an injective function. On the other hand, if t ∈ T loss , we have
Obviously, g N n has order at most 2N . Thus LF2 = log(2 N ) < log N .
Lossy Tag Generation. For an auxiliary tag t a , LF 2 .LTag(F td, t a ) computes t c = CH.Equiv(td ch , t * a , t * c , t a ).
Theorem 7. LF 2 is an (Z N n , log N )-OT-LF under the DCR assumption.
Proof. As we have discussed the lossiness, it remains to show the indistinguishability and evasiveness.
Indistinguishability. For a fixed PPT adversary A, we proceed through a sequence of games. In each game, A interacts with an oracle once to get (t a , t c ), then outputs 1 (indicating that (t a , t c ) is lossy) or 0 (indicating (t a , t c ) is injective). Let out i denote A's output in Game i .
